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NOTE
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES REGULATING
THE HEALING ARTS -

Do

THEY INCLUDE THE POWER

TO REQUIRE A PHYSICAL OR PSYCHIATRIC
EXAMINATION?
INTRODUCTION

Requiring practitioners of the healing arts to be licensed has
long been held to be a reasonable exercise of the police powers
granted to the states.' The rationale for sustaining such licensing
statutes is that these professions have a direct bearing on the
public health, safety, and welfare. Regulating the healing arts
serves as an important means of protecting the public from unscupulous and unqualified practitioners.' What is not clear is the
means by which the administrative agencies can determine
whether a particular applicant is duly qualified-mentally and
physically, as well as educationally-to practice in that particular field.
The traditional test of an applicant's fitness has been a written examination to ascertain whether the individual has a sufficient grasp of the field from an educational standpoint. Within
the recent past, however, boards regulating the practice of the
healing arts professions in several states have expanded their
inquiries to encompass areas other than educational qualification,3 attempting to employ the devices of mental and physical

' Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Ex porte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167,
77 P. 879 (1904); State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20
N.W. 238 (1884); Sherman v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 116 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 P.
879 (1904); Bold v. Board of Medical Examiners, 133 Cal. App. 23, 23 P.2d 826 (1933);
Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935); Kansas State Bd. of Healing
Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical
Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238 (1884); Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State
Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867 (1950); Sherman v. State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 116 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); In re Kindschi, 52 Wash. 2d 8, 319 P.2d
824 (1958).
' Hake v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964); Dixon
v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court,
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examinations to enable them to determine the mental and physical fitness of the applicant to practice in that profession. Appellate courts in these states have handed down substantially different opinions concerning the validity of this exercise of authority.
The purpose of this note is to analyze these examination
requirements in light of the recognized purposes and powers of
administrative agencies. Such an analysis necessarily includes a
consideration of the statutory source of administrative power.
Review of these principles leads to the conclusion that the power
to require examinations, if adequately limited, is an appropriate
administrative function. On this basis, guidelines for defining
and limiting the power are advanced.
A review of the case law underscores the lack of uniformity
in the courts' approaches to agencies' attempts to require a physical or mental examination. Recently, the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld an order of the Board of Optometric Examiners
requiring psychiatric and physical examinations as a prerequisite
to reinstatement of the practitioner's license, holding that the
order did not constitute final agency action and was therefore not
subject to judicial review. 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court took a
different approach, holding that revocation of a physician's license on grounds of mental and emotional incompetency would
be upheld if the action were supported by "competent evidence." 5
The Arkansas court's comment regarding expert testimony
clearly implies the need for a physical or psychiatric examination
as a basis for the revocation.' In Florida, however, a dental
board's order requiring a psychiatric examination was vacated as
"arbitrary, unreasonable and a gross abuse of power." 7
The question of a practitioner's physical or mental competence has also been raised in Arizona' and Washington,' although
December 3, 1973; Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
' Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
Hake v. Arkansas State Medical Bd., 237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964).
Id. at 510, 374 S.W.2d at 176.
Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966).
Batty v. Arizona State Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941).
Hubbard v. Washington State Medical Disciplinary Bd., 55 Wash. 2d 546, 348 P.2d
981 (1960).
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the question of the legitimacy of an administrative order requiring an examination to establish such competence was not directly
confronted. In Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board,'0 Dr. Batty's
license to practice dentistry had been revoked because of, inter
alia, his previous history of pulmonary tuberculosis. Although the
revocation was sustained on those other grounds, the court held
that since the disease was inactive at the time of the proceedings,
it was not grounds for revocation. The court did, however, state
that "one who has an active case of pulmonary tuberculosis is not
physically qualified to practice dentistry . . . ."" This raises the
question of how to determine physical competence if the practitioner/applicant refuses to undergo voluntary testing and if the
board lacks the power to require such an examination.
The Washington case" concerned the mental competence of
a physician who had previously been adjudicated mentally ill.
After entry of a court order declaring Dr. Hubbard to be competent, the Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board notified
Hubbard that a hearing would be held to determine the status of
his medical license. Hubbard appealed the subsequent revocation
of his license, claiming that the "declaration of competence" had
restored his qualifications to practice medicine. The Washington
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
the Oregon court [which declared Hubbard to be mentally competent] could not, nor did it attempt to, determine appellant's competency to engage in the practice of medicine and surgery. This is a
question which, of necessity, requires the judgment of experts."

The court advised Hubbard that he could apply to the board for
reinstatement of his license and produce evidence of his mental
competency to resume the practice of medicine. The onus of dispelling the presumption of incompetence was clearly placed on
the practitioner. Because there is no real distinction between requiring the practitioner to submit proof of his mental or physical
ability and permitting the board to require such proof before
reinstatement of a license, it seems reasonable to assume that the
Washington courts would uphold an agency's requirement of a
physical or mental examination.
57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941).
Id. at 252, 112 P.2d at 876.
HZ Hubbard v. Washington State Medical Disciplinary Bd., 55 Wash. 2d 546,348 P.2d
981 (1960).
"1 Id. at 553, 348 P.2d at 985-86.
"
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The above cases point out the confusion surrounding the
scope of the licensing powers of an administrative agency regulating the healing arts professions. The validity of the delegation of
administrative power, the language of the particular statute creating the administrative agency and defining its powers, and
principles of statutory construction to be used in the interpretation and application of the organic statute are all factors which
must be considered in resolving this confusion.
I. DELEGATION OF POWER TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Legitimacy and Appropriateness of Regulation

A.

Courts have long recognized the vital and legitimate interest
of the state in maintaining high standards for practitioners of the
healing arts. These professions, so directly related to the public
health, safety, and general welfare, require regulation by experts. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the necessity of regulation of the health professions in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 5
observing that "a state has broad power to establish and enforce
standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of
everyone there. The state's discretion in that field naturally extends to the regulation of all professions concerned with health."'"
The justification for such regulation has generally been the
need for protection of the public from persons who are unqualified
to practice the healing arts professions. 7 In Semler v. Oregon
5 the U.S. Supreme
State Board of Dental Examiners"
Court specifically stated that the healing arts professions are subject to
particularly high standards of conduct and qualifications because
of the public interests involved."
Just as the courts have recognized the need for regulation of
the healing arts professions by the state, they have also readily
acknowledged the impossibility of meeting this need by relying
"

The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people
authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure
or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity

Dent v. West Virginia,129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). See also cases cited notes 1 & 2 supra.
13347 U.S. 442 (1954).
'

Id.

"

Cases cited note 2 supra.
294 U.S. 608 (1935). See also Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
294 U.S. at 612.

"
"

at 449.
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solely upon the legislative bodies of the states."0 The degree of
familiarity with the profession required for effective and just regulation exceeds that of most legislators. The responsibility for
licensing has therefore been delegated to administrative agencies
composed of practitioners in each particular field. This delegation of power received the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court
as early as 1923. Its decision in Douglas v. Noble" leaves no room
for doubt about the appropriateness of the delegation of the licensing power to an administrative agency. Supreme courts in
Minnesota 2 and New York23 have also expressed their approval
of this manner of regulation.
Having established that the regulation of the healing arts
professions properly lay with administrative agencies, the courts'
attention necessarily became focused on the extent of the powers
delegated to these boards. Recognizing the principle that the
power to grant a license necessarily implies the power to condition,24 courts have not hesitated to uphold the agencies' actions
denying or revoking licenses, 5 even in the face of the petitioners'
contention that denial or suspension of a license constitutes a
punishment-which the agency lacks authority to impose. 0
The Supreme Court later stated that the scope of an agency's
powers included investigation of an applicant on the initiative of
the board members." Although the case considers the powers of
a state bar association rather than those of a healing arts board,
the language used by the court clearly encompasses any licensing
activity:
20

American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Sage-Allen

Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195 (1935).
21 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
22

State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N.W. 238

(1884).
21 National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. University of N.Y., 8
N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298
(1961).
24 Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 540 (1876); State ex rel. Minces v.
Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N.W. 711 (1898).
" Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Ramsay v. Shelton, 329 Ill. 432, 160 N.E.
769 (1928); Klafter v. State Bd. of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193 (1913);
Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Registration & Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 72 P. 247
(1903), aff'd sub nom. Meffert v. Packer, 195 U.S. 625 (1904); Blumberg v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 96 N.J.L. 331, 115 A. 439 (1921).
" Cases cited note 25 supra.
' In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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Where . . . the State may withhold a privilege available only to

those possessing the requisite qualifications, it is of no constitutional
significance whether the State's interrogation of an applicant on
matters relevant to these qualifications

. . .

is prompted by infor-

mation which it already has about him from other sources, or arises
merely from [the state's] good faith belief in the need for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant."

Although the case is obviously concerned with oral investigations
by the board, the same principle should apply when the board is
seeking information about an applicant's qualifications which
cannot be obtained through mere questioning. If there is a legitimate question about the applicant's qualifications, the board
should be entitled to pursue the matter to its satisfaction.
B.

Enabling Legislation

Any discussion of administrative agencies and their powers
must deal with the statutes which create the agency and which
define and limit its powers. The provisions of the statutes establishing the healing arts regulatory agencies vary greatly-not only
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but also within any given jurisdiction as to each individual agency. Before examining representative statutes,2 a brief review of case law dealing with legislation
purporting to delegate authority to administrative agencies and
of general principles of statutory construction is in order.
1.

Standards for Legislative Delegation

The question which arises most frequently in regard to the
delegation of the authority to regulate the healing arts professions
relates to the specificity of standards which the legislature must
include in the enabling statute to define the board's powers. It is
well settled that the legislature may not grant the authority without providing sufficient guidelines; 30 however, there has been
much litigation seeking to define what constitutes "sufficient"
guidelines.
In Bennett v. IndianaState Board of Registrationand Exam28

Id. at 90.

2 Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1423, 32-1451 (West Supp. 1974-75); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-22-101 (1973); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 453-4, 453-8 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 45:9-16 (West Supp. 1974-75).

United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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ination in Optometry 3' the Indiana Supreme Court upheld an
organic statute which gave the board the power to define unprofessional conduct, observing that it is unrealistic to expect the
legislature to "forbid specifically all improper practices likely to
arise. Of necessity, details of its plan must be left to the board.
The statute fixes the standards upon which the board may act. '3
Many other courts have taken this same stance.3
However, there are jurisdictions which carefully enforce the
requirement of specific standards in legislation establishing agencies which regulate the healing arts professions.34 A Florida statute35 established guidelines to be used by the State Board of
Examiners in Psychology in granting certificates to applicants.
The applicant was required, inter alia, to pass a written and/or
oral examination on psychology, and to hold a doctor of philosophy degree with a major in psychology from a board-approved
university. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court declared the
statute unconsitutional because of the legislative failure to define
the field of the examination and to provide standards to guide the
board in its approval of a university.3 Recognizing that agencies
may make rules within statutorily prescribed limits, the court
found such a lack of those limits as to invalidate the statute. 3
Sixty years prior to the Florida decision, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals struck down that part of a statute granting authority
to revoke a license for unprofessional conduct because it contained inadequate standards to guide the practitioner in his con-

duct .38

3,211 Ind. 678, 7 N.E.2d 977 (1937).
32 Id. at 683, 7 N.E.2d at 981.
See cases cited notes 55-56 infra and accompanying text.
Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906); McMurtry
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Reptr. 910 (1960); Husband
v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1961); Kentucky State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Crowell,
220 Ky. 1, 294 S.W. 818 (1926); Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785
(Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 490.04 (1959).
11 Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1961).
31 Id. at 71. Contra, Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App. 2d 124, 40
Cal. Rptr. 171, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1964) (absence of legislative criteria for approval
of a school by the board of medical examiners does not constitute a violation of the
delegation doctrine).
" Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
The statute does not prescribe the manner by which a physician may regulate his conduct. It does not advise him in advance what act or acts may be
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The California Supreme Court took similar action in Hewitt
v. Board of Medical Examiners.9 The California statute authorized revocation of a medical license for professional or moral unfitness. The court cited Matthews v. Murphy0 in finding the statute too vague and without sufficient standards to guide a physician's conduct.
Both the California and the Kentucky courts placed heavy
emphasis upon the proprietary aspects of a license, stressing that
denial or suspension resulted in depriving the licensee of his livelihood. Except for a brief comment on the need to protect the
public from incompetence (which need both courts seemed to
indicate was met by the very existence of the licensing requirements), the decisions appeared to be more concerned with
the wasted expense and educational efforts of the holder of a
revoked license than with public health, safety, and welfare.
Many courts, however, have specifically stated that a license to
practice the healing arts is not property to which the holder has
an absolute, unqualified right, nor is the taking of a license punishment." Both acts, the licensing and denial or revocation of a
license, are intended to benefit and protect the public.
Davis in his Administrative Law Treatise disapproved of
such highly specific legislative standards, preferring instead the
more valuable tool of judicial review as a restriction on the unchecked exercise of administrative discretion. 2 To insist that the
legislature specify the standards as carefully as the previously
discussed cases seem to require is to ignore a principal reason for
the creation of administrative agencies: to obtain the advantages
of the "special knowledge and special skills which characterize
' 4' 3
the administrative process at its best.
It is submitted that the approach of the Indiana Supreme
Court in Bennett v. Indiana State Board of Registrationand Examination in Optometry" and that of the U.S. Supreme Court in
in violation of its provisions. He is not told what is lawful or unlawful.

Id. at 752, 63 S.W. at 786.
31 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906).

," 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).
" See cases cited note 25 supra.
,2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-.05 (3d ed. 1958).
,1 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (6th ed. 1974). See also McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 211 Ind. 687, 7 N.E.2d 977 (1937).
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American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States45 is most
realistic. It is impractical to expect the legislative body to define
specifically every act which would constitute "unprofessional
conduct." Most legislators would probably be quite unfamiliar
with the intricacies of the healing arts professions and would
therefore be unable to compile a complete or adequate listing of
those acts which might constitute unprofessional conduct. The
vague standard of avoiding the "appearance of impropriety" has
been accepted by the legal profession," and it would seem that
an overt act of unprofessional conduct is even more definite than
the appearance of impropriety.
2.

Principles of Statutory Construction

Rules of statutory construction have established that an
administrative agency has the implied power to formulate rules
and regulations, even when such power has not been expressly
delegated."
In Kee v. Baber," the Texas Supreme Court upheld the validity of a regulation which exemplifies this practice of filling in the
details of the power expressly granted. An optometrist whose license had been revoked for failure to comply with the regulation,
a compilation of specific procedures to be followed in the practice
of optometry, sought a declaration of the regulation's invalidity.
Finding a relationship between failure to follow standard procedures and incompetence, the court determined that the regulation was a proper attempt to implement the provisions of the
enabling statute.
One principle of statutory construction which has frequently
been invoked to limit the administrative agency's power is
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.11 Courts in Colorado,5" Con,5344 U.S. 298 (1953).

ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9.
Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 20, 251 P. 784, 791 (1926).
" 157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957).
"Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
"
In Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Weiler, 157 Colo. 244, 402 P.2d 606
(1965), the supreme court reversed the medical board's revocation of Dr. Weiler's license
on the grounds of "immoral malpractice" because that was not one of the grounds specified in the statute. The decision noted that "the Board's authority comes solely from the
statute itself and it cannot create new grounds for the revocation of a license." Id. at 250,
402 P.2d at 609.
"
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necticut, 5 ' Indiana, 52 and Texas" have relied on the expressio
unius principle in reversing agency action deemed to be outside
the scope of the agency's authority. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court54 and several state supreme courts" have been more cautious in their application of this rule.
Other state courts have consistently emphasized that statutory construction is to be used as a means of ascertaining legislative intent. That intent, when ascertained, takes precedence over
any principles of statutory construction." A decision of the Kansas Supreme Court provides an excellent model for resolving the
" Adam

v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd., 137 Conn. 535, 79 A.2d 350 (1951).
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the revocation of a teacher's license on the
grounds that
[ult is generally accepted doctrine that where a statute or ordinance authorizes the revocation of a license for causes enumerated, such license cannot
be revoked upon any ground other than one of the causes specified.
Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 367, 82 N.E. 792, 795 (1907).
" Carp v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 401 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966). The court determined that the legislature, in setting out 10 specific grounds
for the refusal or cancellation of a license, expressed its intention to exclude all others.
, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
[Wie might agree with appellants' contentions [that the rules promulgated
by the ICC were outside of the express or implied delegation of power to
control certain aspects of the trucking industry] if we thought it a reasonable
canon of interpretation that the draftsmen of acts delegating agency powers,
as a practical and realistic matter, can or do include specific consideration
of every evil sought to be corrected. But no great acquaintance with practical
affairs is required to know that such prescience, either in fact or in the minds
of Congress, does not exist. . . . Its very absence, moreover, is precisely one
of the reasons why regulatory agencies such as the Commission are created,
for it is the fond hope of their authors that they bring to their work the
expert's familiarity with industry conditions which members of the delegating legislatures cannot be expected to possess.
Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted). The language of this decision echoes an earlier English
case, Lowe v. Dorling & Son, [1906] 2 K.B. 772, in which the court noted:
The failure to make the 'expressio' complete very often arises from accident,
very often from the fact that it never struck the draftsman that the thing
supposed to be included needed specific mention of any kind.
Id. at 785.
11Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944); Kansas
State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); Cabell v. Cottage
Grove, 170 Ore. 256, 130 P.2d 1013 (1942).
' Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505 (1944) (principies of statutory construction have no application where they would vary a clear expression of legislative intent in a matter of vital concern to the state); Cabell v. Cottage Grove,
170 Ore. 256, 130 P.2d 1013 (1942). "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a general rule
of construction of statutes (citations omitted). It is to be applied with caution and merely
as an auxiliary rule to determine the legislative intention." Id. at 281, 130 P.2d at 1023.
52
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application of principles of statutory construction with the sometimes conflicting construction of legislative intent." The relevant
statute in effect at that time 58 made no mention of malpractice
as grounds for revocation of a physician's license. The trial court
reversed the state board's revocation of a license on the basis that
application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius necessarily
excluded malpractice as grounds for the revocation. In reversing
the trial court, the Supreme Court of Kansas addressed the relationship between the principles of statutory construction and legislative intent," noting that the purpose of statutory construction
is the discovery and effectuation of legislative intent. Since the
intent of the healing arts act was clear-the protection of the
public from incompetent practitioners-the principle of statutory
construction on which the trial court had relied was not only
unnecessary but indeed defeated the very purpose of the statute.
Obviously, the extent to which a state has committed itself
to the expressio unius rule and the weight which the state attaches to legislative intent will be vitally important in resolving
the question of whether an administrative agency can justify an
examination requirement.
II.

REPRESENTATIVE STATUTES

Statutes which regulate the healing arts professions can generally be grouped into two categories-those which specifically
grant or clearly imply mental or physical incompetence as
grounds for revocation, suspension, or denial of a license, and
those which fail to mention either as a ground for such disciplinary action. Representative statutes have been selected, and a
discussion of the feasibility of the examination requirement in the
context of each of the statutory types follows.
Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836 (1963).
SKAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2801 (1963) states:
Recognizing that the practice of the healing arts is a privilege granted by
legislative authority and is not a natural right of individuals, it is deemed
necessary as a matter of policy in the interests of public health, safety, and
welfare, to provide laws and provisions. . . to the end that the public shall
be properly protected against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized and
unqualified practice of the healing arts and from unprofessional conduct by
persons licensed to practice under this act.

'T
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Statutes Requiring Physical or Mental Capacity

The first general classification of statutes includes those statutes authorizing revocation, suspension, or denial of a license to
practice any of the healing arts due to physical or mental incompetency. These statutes may do so either expressly or impliedly.
1.

Express Authorization

In the Arizona statutes, one portion of the chapter regarding
regulation of professions and occupations sets forth the requirements for obtaining a medical license. The applicant is specifically required to establish his physical and mental competence. 0
One section in this chapter6 sets forth the procedure for challenging a physician's physical, mental, or medical competence. It
authorizes the board to commence an investigation on its own
report or that of any physician or medical society. The board may
set up either an informal interview or a formal hearing and may
require mental, physical, and/or medical competence examinations. A finding by the board that the physician is mentally or
physically unable to practice medicine safely or is medically incompetent is sufficient to sustain an order suspending or revoking
his license-permanently, temporarily, or conditionally.
There can be no doubt that a board operating under such an
enabling statute has the power to require these examinations at
any stage of the proceeding-whether the applicant is submitting
his initial application, applying for renewal of the license, or is
the holder of an unexpired license which is being challenged. The
only area left to the discretion of the Arizona Board of Medical
*0ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1423 (West Supp. 1974-75) provides:
To procure a regular license to practice medicine.

. . an applicant.

. . shall

submit evidence satisfactory to the board that he meets each of the following
requirements:
(5) That he is physically and mentally able safely to engage in the
practice of medicine and submits to such physical examination, mental evaluation and interview or any combination thereof, as the board may deem
proper to determine the same.

'

The board may require the submission of such credentials or other proof,
written and oral, and make such investigation as it deems necessary adequately to advise itself with respect to an applicant's ability to meet any of
the foregoing requirements.
Id. § 32-1451.
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Examiners is the determination of the circumstances or behavior
on the part of the applicant or licensee which would justify the
examinations, since time and expense considerations preclude
examination of every applicant. The statute does grant the board
absolute discretion in requiring these examinations, but caution
must be exercised to prevent abuse of this discretion. For example, if the board were to require the examination of all minority
applicants but few, if any, white male applicants, it would invite
charges of discrimination. This potential problem is common to
each type of statute and can be eliminated only by regulations
specifying the bases for the examination requirements.
2. Implied Authorization
The second type of statute, impliedly authorizing revocation,
suspension, or denial of licenses for physical or mental incompetency, is exemplified by a New Jersey statute. 2 The general authorization for disciplinary action on physical or mental grounds
is present, but the procedures and specific grants of authority to
require examinations are not. The statute authorizes disciplinary
action both on the basis of an "adjudication of insanity" 3 and on
the basis of a "determination of incapacity."64 While the former
basis requires court action, confusion could arise because the latter basis does not specify the source of the determination.
In view of the generally accepted principle that administrative agencies have the implied authority to promulgage regulations which are necessary to implement their express powers,65 an
examination requirement should be justifiable under such a statute. The statute clearly authorizes disciplinary proceedings
against the licensee for physical or mental incompetence. A decision by the board to take action against the licensee without
benefit of an expert's opinion constitutes a gross abuse of discre"

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16 (West Supp. 1974-75) provides:
The [State Board of Medical Examiners] may refuse to grant or may suspend or revoke a license or the registration of a certificate or diploma to
practice medicine and surgery or chiropractic . . . upon proof to the satisfaction of the board that the holder of such license (a) has been adjudicated
insane, or. . . (d) has been determined to be physically or mentally incapacitated . . ..

u Id. § 45:9-16(a).
Id. § 45:9-16(d).
' Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1,20, 251 P. 784, 791 (1926).
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tion, as the Arkansas Supreme Court clearly indicated in Hake
v. Arkansas State Medical Board.6
The Colorado State Board of Optometric Examiners was
functioning under this type of statute when it entered its order
requiring both a mental and a physical examination in the
Dixon 7 case. The relevant portion of that statute provided for
suspension or revocation of the license of an optometrist for "continuing in the practice of optometry during any period of mental
disability or while afflicted with a communicable, infectious, or
contagious disease of such a serious nature as to render him a
menace to patients."6 8 The Colorado Court of Appeals did not
deal with the question of whether the statute granted the board
the implied authority to require examinations of the licensees,
instead declaring that because the board's order did not constitute final agency action, it was not subject to judicial review.6"
This position is unwise because it gives the administrative agencies almost unlimited power as long as they couch the examination requirement in terms of an "intermediate" decision rather
than a final order. The statute appears to give the optometric
board the implied power to condition reinstatement or renewal of
a license on the submission of a satisfactory report from a physician or a psychiatrist. If the Colorado Court of Appeals was in fact
approving such an exercise of power, it is unfortunate that the
decision did not specifically indicate such approval.
B. Statutes without Requirements as to Physical or Mental
Capacity
A more difficult situation is presented by statutes which neither make the applicant's health a requirement for issuance of a
license nor make physical or mental illness grounds for license
suspension or revocation. The possibility of requiring a mental or
physical examination under such a statute depends upon whether
the statute includes a general statement of intent.
1.

Statutes containing general statement of intent

When the statute has clearly set out the purpose for its pas237 Ark. 506, 374 S.W.2d 173 (1964).
Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 102-1-16 (1963), now codified as Id. § 12-40-119(e)(1973).
6 Dixon v. Riley, 515 P.2d 1139 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, December 3, 1973.
'
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sage, there may be sufficient grounds to conclude that the agency
has the power to require physical and mental examinations. The
Colorado statute creating the pharmacy board,7' for example,
acknowledges that the licensing of pharmacists is a matter of
public interest and concern which affects the public health, and
requires that its provisions be liberally construed. An agency operating under such a statute may have the power to require physical and mental examinations despite the fact that nowhere in the
act is there any language directly relating to physical or mental
health.7 Where the legislature has stated that the intent is to
protect the public and has urged a broad or liberal construction,
the board should be allowed to require these examinations in the
interest of insuring the abilities of the licensee. It would seem to
be within the court's discretion to take judicial notice of the fact
that to allow an individual afflicted with a physical or mental
impairment to practice the healing arts is not in the best interests
of the public health, safety, and welfare.
Yet, under a strict application of the expressio unius rule,
when neither physical nor mental incapacity is a statutory basis
for disciplinary action, both must be deemed to be specifically
excluded. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in American
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States,7" however, militates
against a universal application of such a rule of statutory construction."
2. Statutes containing neither general health requirements
nor a statement of legislative intent
Legislation similar to Hawaii's statute dealing with the licensing of physicians7" creates a situation in which mental or
physical examinations will be extremely difficult to justify. NoCoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-22-101 (1973) provides:
The practice of pharmacy is declared a professional practice affecting the
public health, safety and welfare, and is subject to regulation and control in
the public interest. It is a matter of public interest and concern that the
practice of pharmacy as defined in this article, merits and receives the confidence of the public, and that only qualified persons be permitted to practice pharmacy in this state. This article shall be liberally construed to carry
out these objects and purposes.
' See Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Registration & Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 72
P. 247 (1903), aff'd sub nom. Meffert v. Packer; 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
72 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
71See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
74 HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 453-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974).
70
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where in the statute is there any mention of a general public
purpose or of legislative intent, nor is revocation, suspension, or
denial of a physician's license on grounds of his health authorized. The qualifications for licensing concern United States citizenship, good moral character, and educational requirements.75
Revocation or suspension of a license may be based on a number
of grounds, but only two have even an indirect bearing on the
applicant's health: being habitually intemperate and habitually
using any habit-forming drugs.7" A board attempting to require a
physical examination of an applicant might seek to justify its
order on the grounds that the power is necessarily implied because a physical examination may be necessary to establish habitual intemperance or drug addiction. However, application of
the expressio unius principle would limit the examination to discovery of an alcohol- or drug-abuse problem, and would exclude
the possibility of a psychiatric examination.
Because many courts have acknowledged that the purpose of
the regulation of the healing arts professions is the protection of
the public,7 7 the missing legislative declaration of purpose might
be supplied through case law. If the public purpose statement can
be thus supplied, an argument to the court in support of the
exercise of the power to require physical or mental examinations
would proceed as if the purpose were contained in the legislative
declaration.
Davis was undoubtedly suggesting one way of dealing with
problems resulting from an insufficient delegation of statutory
power when he observed that "one major responsibility of every
agency, too often neglected, is to watch for insufficiencies in the
legislation it administers, and to make sufficient recommendations for changes, based upon an understanding of the details of
administration."" An administrative agency functioning under a
statute such as Hawaii's should press for legislation sufficiently
specific to allow the agency to require mental and physical tests
to assure itself of the applicant's competence.
11Id. §
76

453-4.

Id. § 453-8.

, See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 53 (1969).

"
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III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Although the power to require physical and psychiatric examinations of practitioners in the healing arts professions is
highly desirable to ensure that only qualified individuals are licensed, granting this power without setting forth appropriate statutory guidelines invites abuses of discretion by the regulatory
agencies. Judicial review of an order for a psychiatric or physical
examination is, of course, one obvious and important means of
protecting the practitioner, but the need for such review can be
substantially curtailed by establishing realistic limits on the
board's power to require these examinations.
These restrictions must speak to two general areas-limitation of the board's discretion in ordering the examinations, and
establishment of guidelines to be considered in evaluating the
applicant's mental and physical fitness.
A primary limitation on the examination requirement is its
purpose, which is not to exclude persons whose social behavior
does not conform to the norm, but only those whose deviations
would substantially impair their ability to practice their chosen
professions. Similarly, a physical handicap should not bar an
applicant from practice of the healing arts professions unless a
direct correlation between the handicap and the resulting incompetence of the practitioner can be proved. Unless the deviation
from the norm, whether mental or physical, is related to the
ability to perform, such a deviation should not justify requiring
a physical or psychiatric examination as a prerequisite to the
issuance or renewal of a license.
The board's discretion to order examinations may also be
limited procedurally. One procedural consideration is the question of what specific circumstances would be required to justify
exercise of the examination prerogative. Certainly sworn complaints regarding aberrant or offensive behavior" and evidence of
the contracting of a communicable disease should constitute
grounds for a required examination. In areas of concern where the
need for an examination is less obvious, the board must move
with extreme caution to forestall allegations of arbitrariness or of
abuse of discretion. Explicit written standards compiled by the
", See Florida State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Graham, 187 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (such complaints were the basis for the board's action).
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board could supply applicants or licensees required to submit to
an examination with a basis for challenging that requirement,
although it would be impossible to include in such a compilation
every conceivable situation which would justify an examination.
Discussions with professional organizations, individual practitioners, and other agencies regulating the healing arts-both
within and without the state-would be of great assistance in
drafting these standards.
A requirement that the board provide the examinee with a
choice of board-approved examining physicians, rather than just
one, is a second possible procedural limitation on the board's
authority. Furthermore, the examinee could be given the option
of obtaining a report from a psychiatrist or physician of his own
choosing to rebut the report of the board-approved examiner.
Both these procedures would reduce the possibility of bias on the
part of the examining physician.
A third possible procedural limitation on the board's authority might be protection of the practitioner by an increased administrative burden of proof. If the board were required to prove its
case for requiring the examination beyond a reasonable doubt
instead of by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the licenses
of those practitioners against whom the board had less than a
clear-cut case would be spared.
The standards to guide the examiner in his evaluation may
be more difficult to compile, but they are no less important. The
board should at least be required to advise the examining physician of the alleged actions, misconduct, or other condition on
which the examination requirement is based. The circumstances
of a particular case might also justify presentation of a specific
statement of the practitione's duties and responsibilities to the
examiner to assist him in determining to what extent the alleged
infirmities would interfere with the practitioner's capabilities.
If a disability is discovered, the examiner's report to the
board should contain his evaluation of the possibilities of cure or
rehabilitation of the subject practitioner. In the realm of physical
problems, for example, a cataract which impairs the licensee's
vision is an obvious basis for suspending the license until the
cataract has been removed and vision has been restored. But
because it would be manifestly unjust permanently to revoke a
license on the basis of a correctible impairment, the expert's opin-

HEALING ARTS

ion as to the remedies available to the incapacitated practitioner
and a second examination at a later date to assess the degree of
restoration are imperative.
The foregoing suggestions are to be considered as general
guidelines designed primarily to call attention to the questions
which must be considered in connection with the exercise of a
necessary power of administrative agencies, but one which is subject to gross abuse of discretion. The author claims no degree of
expertise in the practice of any of the healing arts professions and
would readily concur with previously cited judicial opinions 0 recognizing the particular qualifications of administrative agencies
to supply greater details.
CONCLUSION

Neither the legitimacy of the state's interest in the regulation
of the healing arts professions nor the delegation of regulatory
powers to an administrative agency is subject to challenge today.
However, whether such regulatory powers include the power to
require a physical or mental examination is open to question. The
approaches which the state courts have taken to this problem are
as varied as the final resolutions of the cases in which the matter
has been presented. Although only those agencies functioning
under an organic statute which specifically grants the power to
require these examinations can be assured that such an examination order will be upheld, strong arguments can be made in support of the contention that such a power is necessarily implied in
the other types of statutes discussed. Regardless of the type of
statute involved, it is incumbent upon the agency seeking to exercise this power to draft rules and standards sufficiently specific
to protect the interests of the applicants and practitioners who
will be subject to this power.
Carol M. Welch
"oSee note

20 supra and accompanying text.

